Levin releases email showing Goldman Sachs fraud.

http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=324169

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 24, 2010	Contact: Senator Levin's Office Phone: 202.224.6221
Senate Subcommittee Investigating Financial Crisis Releases Documents on Role of Investment Banks
WASHINGTON – The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations released several exhibits that will be among those discussed on Tuesday at the fourth of its hearings on the causes and consequences of the financial crisis. The exhibits are available at this link. Using Goldman Sachs as a case study, the April 27 hearing will focus on the role of investment banks in contributing to the worst U.S. economic crisis since the 1930s, resulting in the foreclosure of millions of homes, the shuttering of businesses, and the loss of millions of American jobs. The Subcommittee, whose Chairman is Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., and whose Ranking Republican is Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla., has conducted a nearly year and a half investigation into the 2008 financial crisis. “Investment banks such as Goldman Sachs were not simply market-makers, they were self-interested promoters of risky and complicated financial schemes that helped trigger the crisis,” said Sen. Levin. “They bundled toxic mortgages into complex financial instruments, got the credit rating agencies to label them as AAA securities, and sold them to investors, magnifying and spreading risk throughout the financial system, and all too often betting against the instruments they sold and profiting at the expense of their clients.” The 2009 Goldman Sachs annual report stated that the firm “did not generate enormous net revenues by betting against residential related products.” Levin said, “These e-mails show that, in fact, Goldman made a lot of money by betting against the mortgage market.” The four exhibits released today are Goldman Sachs internal e-mails that address practices involving residential mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), financial instruments that were key in the financial crisis. Goldman Sachs Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Lloyd Blankfein and other current and former company personnel are scheduled to testify at Tuesday's hearing. In one of the e-mails released today, Mr. Blankfein stated that the firm came out ahead in the mortgage crisis by taking short positions. In an e-mail exchange with other top Goldman Sachs executives, Mr. Blankfein wrote: “Of course we didn't dodge the mortgage mess. We lost money, then made more than we lost because of shorts.” In a second e-mail, Goldman Sachs Chief Financial Officer David Viniar, who also will testify on Tuesday, responded to a report on the firm's trading activities, showing that – in one day - the firm netted over $50 million by taking short positions that increased in valued as the mortgage market cratered. Mr. Viniar wrote: “Tells you what might be happening to people who don't have the big short.” Levin said: “There it is, in their own words: Goldman Sachs taking ‘the big short’ against the mortgage market.” In a third e-mail, Goldman employees discussed the ups and downs of securities that were underwritten and sold by Goldman and tied to mortgages issued by Washington Mutual Bank's subprime lender, Long Beach Mortgage Company. Reporting the “wipeout” of one Long Beach security and the “imminent” collapse of another as “bad news” that would cost the firm $2.5 million, a Goldman Sachs employee then reported the “good news” – that the failure would bring the firm $5 million from a bet it had placed against the very securities it had assembled and sold. In a fourth e-mail, a Goldman Sachs manager reacted to news that the credit rating agencies had downgraded $32 billion in mortgage related securities – causing losses for many investors – by noting that Goldman had bet against them: “Sounds like we will make some serious money.” His colleague responded: “Yes we are well positioned.” Prior hearings of the Subcommittee have looked at how high risk lending strategies, bank regulatory failures, and inflated credit ratings contributed to the financial crisis. Next Tuesday’s hearing examining the role of investment banks will be the final hearing in the quartet of hearings on “Wall Street and the Financial Crisis.” The hearing will begin at 10:00 a.m. in room 106 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building.

Inside Job - a well-told story of the big financial sharks.

This American Life tells another part of the story of the sharks betting against the American Dream.

http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/405/inside-job

New Senate report on says Treasury programs are not resolving the mortgage forclosure crisis.

http://cop.senate.gov/press/releases/release-041410-aprilforeclosure.cfm

Panel Applauds Recent HAMP Revisions, But Treasury's Programs Are Not Keeping Pace with the Foreclosure Crisis

WASHINGTON, D.C. - The Congressional Oversight Panel today released its April oversight report, "Evaluating Progress of TARP Foreclosure Mitigation Programs." The Panel commended recent changes to the mortgage modification program designed to reach more homeowners, but found that Treasury is still struggling to get its foreclosure programs off the ground even as the crisis continues unabated.

Since the Panel's last examination of foreclosure mitigation efforts in October 2009, Treasury has taken steps to address concerns that the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) did not adequately address foreclosures caused by unemployment or negative equity, including by establishing a voluntary principal reduction program. Despite these and other efforts, foreclosures continue at a rapid pace. In 2009, 2.8 million homeowners received a foreclosure notice, and nearly one in four homeowners with a mortgage currently has negative equity. While housing prices have begun to stabilize in many regions, home values in several metropolitan areas continue to fall sharply.

The Panel found that "Treasury's response continues to lag well behind the pace of the crisis" and that, even when HAMP is fully operational, they "will not reach the overwhelming majority of homeowners in trouble." The report raises three specific concerns with Treasury's foreclosure programs:

Timeliness. Since early 2009, Treasury has initiated half a dozen foreclosure mitigation programs, gradually ramping up the incentives for participation by borrowers, lenders, and servicers. Although Treasury should be commended for trying new approaches, its pattern of providing ever more generous incentives might backfire, as lenders and servicers might opt to delay modifications in hopes of eventually receiving a better deal.

Sustainability. Although HAMP modifications reduce a homeowner's mortgage payments, many borrowers continue to experience severe financial strain. HAMP typically does not reduce the total principal balance of a mortgage, meaning that a borrower who was underwater before receiving a HAMP modification will likely remain underwater afterward. Many borrowers will eventually redefault and face foreclosure. Redefaults signal the worst form of failure of the HAMP program: billions of taxpayer dollars will have been spent to delay rather than prevent foreclosures.

Accountability. The Panel is concerned that the sum total of announced funding for Treasury's individual foreclosure programs exceeds the total amount set aside for foreclosure prevention. Treasury must be clearer about how much taxpayer money it intends to spend. Additionally, it must thoroughly monitor the activities of participating lenders and servicers, audit them, and enforce program rules with strong penalties for failure to follow the requirements.

The full report is available at cop.senate.gov.

The Congressional Oversight Panel was created to oversee the expenditure of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds authorized by Congress in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) and to provide recommendations on regulatory reform. The Panel members are: former Securities and Exchange Commissioner Paul S. Atkins; J. Mark McWatters; Richard H. Neiman, Superintendent of Banks for the State of New York; Damon Silvers, Policy Director and Special Counsel for the AFL-CIO; and Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.